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DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF ILLEGITIMACY IN
MARYLAND'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
The author investigates the manner in which Maryland's wrong-
ful death statute discriminates against illegitimate children. An
evaluation of this statute is made in the light of recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the rights of illegitimates. The
author concludes that the current Maryland law as applied to an
illegitimate child's right to recover for the wrongful death of his
father is unconstitutional.
English common law established that a child was illegitimate if it was
conceived and born out of wedlock.1 If the parents were married at the
time of the birth, the child was legitimate, even if they were not
married at the time of conception. Marriage of the parents after birth
would not legitimate the child, and a child was born illegitimate if born
after the marriage of the mother to a man other than the father.2
The illegitimate suffered several disadvantages at common law. Chief
among these was the prohibition against inheritance from his father or
mother.3 In addition to the common law disabilities, illegitimate chil-
dren have frequently been excluded from the benefits of social pro-
grams such as workmen's compensation and wrongful death statutes.4
For example, Maryland's wrongful death statute,' as interpreted by the
Court of Appeals,6 establishes the right of legitimate children to re-
cover for the wrongful death of their father, but does not extend the
same right to illegitimate children. The existence of this disability is
aggravated by the high rate of illegitimacy. On a national level, ten
percent of all births between 1960 and 1970 were illegitimate, and in
some urban areas illegitimate births exceeded fifty percent."
1. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 156 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. The
classifications of legitimate and illegitimate were made either because of the Church's
view that marriage was sacred, or because the blood relationship could be proved with
greater certainty where the offspring were born to married parents. Id. at 155.
2. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 419, 429 (1900). Soon, the
illegitimate class was further subdivided and the status of members within the class came
to be based on the degree of sinfulness of their parent's intercourse. Children born to maid
servants were preferred over the offspring of casual unions, and lowest in status were the
illegitimates born from adulterous or incestuous relationships. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY:
LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSE].
3. Clark, supra note 1, at 155. He also had no claim on his father for support, but soon the
poor laws gave him such a claim. Id.
4. See, e.g., the statutes considered in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1969); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
5. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., §§ 3-901 to -904 (1974).
6. State ex rel. Holt v. Try, Inc., 220 Md. 270, 152 A.2d 126 (1959).
7. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 48, 50
(1969); N.Y. Times, July 1, 1968, at 21, col. 1; U. S. NEWS& WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 1967, at
85.
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Some relief has been given to the illegitimate, largely from a trend
toward narrowing the definition of "born out of wedlock."' In Eng-
land, a presumption arose that children born to a married woman were
the children of her husband and therefore legitimate, unless the hus-
band was "beyond the four seas" or he could prove impotency.9 In the
United States, statutory provisions were enacted which "legitimated"
children when their parents married after the child's birth or when the
identity of the father was established through a paternity proceeding.' 0
More direct relief has been provided to the illegitimate by a series of
recent Supreme Court decisions.' ' These decisions, applying the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, have held some forms
of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children uncon-
stitutional. After an analysis of the Maryland wrongful death statute
and its interpretation, these recent cases and their effect on the Mary-
land statute will be discussed.
THE MARYLAND STATUTE AND ITS INTERPRETATION
At common law a cause of action for injuries intentionally or
negligently inflicted was personal to the victim and died with him.' 2
Nor were the family or relations of the deceased permitted to recover
for his death.' ' The result was a strange anomaly: the wrongdoer could
be held accountable for his actions if his victim lived, but not if he
died.'" Far worse, a family deprived of its means of support was
without a remedy against the wrongdoer.' '
To avoid this harsh result, Maryland adopted Lord Campbell's Act' 6
in 1852. The Maryland version' 7 created a right of action against the
tortfeasor causing death for the benefit of designated claimants.' 8 The
8. KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 11.
9. Id. at 16; CLARK, supra note 1, at 156, 172.
10. "Every one of the fifty states has a statute of one kind or another enabling parents to
legitimate their illegitimate children." CLARK, supra note 1, at 158. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE
art. 93, § 1-208 (1969).
11. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
12. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 901 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser speculates that the rationale for the
rule was as follows:
IT ]he early cases usually were those of homicide, for which the crown executed the
defendant and confiscated all his property, so that nothing was left for tort
compensation; and if not homicide, it was still to be expected that lesser crimes
should be redressed by the crown rather than the successors of the deceased.
Id. at 898.
13. Id. at 901; Stewart v. United Elec. & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906).
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
15. Id.
16. 9 & 10 Vicr., c. 93 (1846).
17. Act of May 25, 1852, c. 299, [1852] Laws of Maryland.
18. The claimants were the wife, husband, parent or child of the deceased. Id.
The deceased's estate is not a claimant. The damages recoverable are primarily for
loss of services or support. See 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 318 (1974). Since the recovery is not a
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statute now provides: "An action under this subtitle shall be for the
benefit of the wife, husband, parent, or child of the deceased per-
son." 1 This phrase, if it stood alone, might be interpreted to authorize
a wrongful death action on behalf of an illegitimate child as well as a
legitimate child in view of a separate statutory provision, article 1,
section 16, which requires construction of the word "child" to include
an illegitimate child "unless such a construction would be unreason-
able.,,2 0 But the statute defines the word "child" as follows: " 'Child'
means a person under 18 years of age and includes an illegitimate child
of a deceased mother."'2 ' This definition indicates that an illegitimate
child may recover for the wrongful death of his mother, but implies
that he may not do so for the wrongful death of his father.2 ' The
conflict between this sentence and the statutory mandate that "child"
be construed to include an illegitimate child unless such a construction
would be unreasonable, was resolved in State ex rel. Holt v. Try, Inc.
2 3
In Holt illegitimate children were attempting to recover for the
wrongful death of their putative father. They contended that Article 1,
Section 16, required that the word "child" in the wrongful death
statute be construed to include illegitimate children. The court dis-
agreed. In 1937 an amendment to the wrongful death statute was
part of the deceased's estate, it is not subject to the claims of his creditors. Stewart v.
United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 340, 65 A. 49, 52 (1906).
A separate statutory provision authorizes a deceased's personal representative to
commence any action the deceased, if he had lived, would have had against the
tortfeasor. MD. ANN CODE art. 93, § 7-401(n) (Supp. 1973). The damages recoverable in
this "survival action" include: pecuniary losses sustained by the deceased; conscious
pain and suffering, Tri-State Poultry Corp. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 57 A.2d 812 (1948);
funeral expenses not exceeding $2,000, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 7-401 (n) (Supp. 1973);
and punitive damages, Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721
(1972). Since any recovery becomes part of the deceased's estate, it is subject to the
claims of his creditors. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 336, 65 A.
49, 51 (1906).
The "survival action" is of no benefit to an illegitimate child of a deceased father,
unless the deceased provides for the child by will. The intestate succession statute
authorizes inheritance from a father by "issue". MD. ANN. CODE art. 93. § 3-101, -103
(1969). "Issue" does not include an illegitimate child, id. § 1-209, although it does
include a legitimated child, id. § 1-208. Thus, a child born illegitimate who has not been
legitimated may not share in his father's estate. See Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308,
315, 262 A.2d 729, 733 (1970). Cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 164 (1972).
19. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-904(a) (1974).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 16 (1968) provides: "The word child or its equivalent shall be
construed to include any illegitimate child, except in matters of inheritance, descent or
distribution of real and personal property, unless such a construction would be
unreasonable."
21. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-901(b) (1974).
22. The statute defines "parent" as follows: "'Parent' includes the mother of a deceased
illegitimate child." Id. § 3-901(c). This language implies that fathers may not recover for
the wrongful death of their illegitimate children. No reported Maryland case has dealt
with this subject; however, the following discussion of the right of an illegitimate child to
recover for the wrongful death of his father should be applicable to discrimination against
a father seeking to recover for his illegitimate child's wrongful death. See notes 51 & 70
infra.
23. 220 Md. 270, 152 A.2d 126 (1959). This case construed former MD. ANN. CODE art, 67, § 4




proposed which would have enlarged the class of potential claimants.
As originally introduced, the bill provided that, in certain circum-
stances, an action could be brought for the benefit of an illegitimate
child for the wrongful death of his father. However, the portion
authorizing such an action was eliminated from the bill before
enactment. The court reasoned that this action manifested a legislative
intent to exclude illegitimate children from such recovery. The court
concluded that, since construction of the word 'child' to include an
illegitimate child would be unreasonable in the face of such clear
legislative intention to the contrary, no action could be brought under
the Maryland statute for the benefit of the plaintiff's illegitimate
children.
Despite the result in Holt, there are at least three possible instances
in which an illegitimate child may recover when his father is killed.
First, the wrongful death statute establishes two classes of claimants.
The primary claimants are the spouse, parents and legitimate children
of the deceased.2 4 However, if there are no primary claimants, then an
action is authorized on behalf of a secondary class of claimants. This
second class of claimants includes "any person related to the deceased
person by blood or marriage who was wholly dependent upon the
deceased."' s
Clearly, even under the harsh common law doctrines, an illegitimate
child is a "person";26 and, equally as certain, if the deceased was his
father they are related "by blood." If, then, an illegitimate child of a
deceased father could prove that he was "wholly dependent" on the
deceased, recovery should be authorized so long as no primary bene-
ficiary qualifies. In Holt the court held that an illegitimate child was
not a primary claimant in an action for his father's wrongful death.
Since the deceased's mother (a primary claimant) was a party in the
same action, the court expressed no opinion on whether the illegitimate
children could recover as secondary claimants.2 ' Nor has any other
Maryland case been reported in which an illegitimate child was able to
recover on this basis.
2 8
A second possible limitation on the result in Holt is Maryland's
legitimation statute. The statute provides that a child "born to parents
who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other shall
be deemed to be the child of his mother, [but] shall be deemed to be
24. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-904(a) (1974).
25. Id. § 3-904 (1974) provides:
(a) Primary beneficiaries.-An action under this subtitle shall be for the
benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased person.
(b) Secondary beneficiaries.-If there are no persons who qualify under
subsection (a), an action shall be for the benefit of any person related to the
deceased by blood or marriage who was wholly dependent upon the deceased.
See Whittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 272 A.2d 57 (1970).
26. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
27. 220 Md. at 274 n.4, 152 A.2d at 128 n.4 (1959).
28. A deceased's sister is a secondary claimant, McKeon v. State ex rel. Conrad, 211 Md. 437,
127 A.2d 635 (1956).
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the child of his father only" if one of four conditions is met. These four
conditions are quite comprehensive, considerably narrowing the com-
mon law definition of illegitimate.2 9 But the legitimation statute is
found ini the article on Decedents' Estates, 3 0 and there is some ques-
tion as to its applicability to the wrongful death statute.3 ' If the
legitimation statute is applicable to the wrongful death statute, then a
legitimated child would be authorized to recover for the wrongful death
of his father as a primary claimant.
The thrust of the legitimation statute is toward inheritance. An
introductory section of the Decedents' Estates article qualifies the
definition of "legitimated child" by saying, "when used in this arti-
cle. .. ."2 A later section says that the rules of construction are to be
"applied in construing all provisions of this article and the terms of a
will." 3 Yet despite this thrust, a Maryland court has held that the
legitimation statute is not limited in application to inheritance matters
only.3 4 The court's rationale was that, at common law and in its
statutory derivatives, inheritance rights were regarded with the most
solemn reverence, and if the law provided a method of legitimation for
the purposes of inheritance, such a procedure was of sufficient legal
validity to establish other rights. However, so far the application of the
legitimation statute has been expanded only to the areas of support,3 '
and the rights of the father to notification of adoption proceedings and
removal of his children from Maryland.3 6 No reported case has con-
sidered whether a child who has been legitimated by conformance with
one of the four conditions in the legitimation statutes is a "child" for
purposes of the wrongful death statute.
There are, however, good reasons why the application of the legiti-
mation statute should not be limited to inheritance matters. Applica-
tion to other areas is consistent with the general trend toward mitigat-
ing the impact of illegitimacy and lessening the severity of the com-
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93. § 1-208 (1969) provides:
A person born to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony
with each other shall be deemed to be the child of his mother. He shall be deemed
to be the child of his father only if his father (1) has been judicially determined to
be the father in a proceeding brought under § 66E of Article 16, (2) has
acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father, (3) has openly and notoriously
recognized the person to be his child, or (4) has subsequently married the mother
and has acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father.
At common law a child was illegitimate if it was both conceived and born out of
wedlock. 1 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 419, 429
(1900).
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93 (1969) deals with "Decedents Estates."
31. At first glance the problem may appear similar to that decided in Holt, but here the
question concerns the definition of the word "legitimate" rather than the construction of
the word "child."
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-101 (1969).
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-201 (1969).
34. Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 542, 283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971).
35. Id. at 545, 283 A.2d at 782. See also Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 315, 262 A.2d 729,
733 (1970) (dictum) (legitimate child's duty to support his father).
36. Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 542, 283 A.2d 777, 782 (1971).
1974]
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mon law rules.3 In addition, the wrongful death statute and the
inheritance statute have similar purposes. The inheritance statute pro-
vides for the distribution of an intestate's property among his family
and relations according to his presumed intent.3 Presumably, his
intent would be to provide for those who are dependent on him. 3 9
Thus, at least one purpose of the statute is to provide support for the
deceased's family and relations.
The wrongful death statute has a similar purpose and achieves a
similar result. The claimants are authorized to recover damages equiva-
lent to the benefit they would have received from the earnings of the
deceased had he lived.4 0 Since the two statutes may be said to have a
similar purpose, and to achieve a similar result, it would seem reason-
able to conclude that a determination of those who are to benefit from
the two statutes should be made by applying the same test. If the
legitimation statute were applied to define who is an illegitimate child
for purposes of the wrongful death statute, then some children would
be authorized to recover despite being illegitimate under the far stricter
common law definition.
A third limitation on the disability of an illegitimate child to recover
for his father's wrongful death arises from Maryland's workmen's com-
pensation statute. 4 ' The statute authorizes compensation to any "de-
pendent" of an employee who is killed in the scope of workmen's
compensation-covered employment, 4 2 and treats dependent legitimate
and illegitimate children equally.4  When an employee is killed under
circumstances which create liability in someone other than the em-
ployer, the dependents may proceed either by wrongful death action
against the tortfeasor or against the employer for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits. If the latter course is elected and workmen's compen-
sation is awarded, the employer or his insurance company is subrogated
to the right the dependents have against the tortfeasor.4 4
In Storrs v. Mech,4  the dependent sister of a workman who was
killed on the job by a tortfeasor, rightfully recovered as a "dependent"
under the workmen's compensation statute. A question then arose as to
whether the workman's employer, who had paid the award to the
dependent sister, could bring a wrongful death action to enforce for his
own benefit the liability of the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor challenged the
employer's suit, contending that since the sister was not a spouse,
37. Id. at 542, 283 A.2d at 780; Rowe v. Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 361, 9 A.2d 585, 587 (1939). "The
trend of the courts throughout the country is to give a liberal interpretation to
legitimation statutes.,.." MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-208, Comment (1969).
38. Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 234, 170 A.2d 176, 180 (1961).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93 §§ 3-102 to -104 (1969).
40. Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516, 531 (D. Md. 1959).
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (1964).
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1973).
43. Huber v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 241 F. Supp. 646 (D. Md. 1965).
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (Supp. 1973).
45. 166 Md. 124, 170 A. 743 (1934).
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parent or child of the deceased,4 6 she could not maintain a wrongful
death action. He then argued that under the theory of subrogation the
employer could stand in no better position than the dependent sister to
whom he had paid benefits. His argument was not accepted. The court
reasoned that the act of the wrongdoer was as responsible for the
employer's having to pay damages to the deceased's dependent sister,
as it would have been if the sister were a spouse, parent or child. The
court could not see any equitable reason why the employer should have
the right to compel the tortfeasor to reimburse him in one case but not
the other. In effect, the court held that since the sister was entitled to
recover under the workmen's compensation law, she was added to the
class of claimants who may recover under the wrongful death statute.
Therefore, the employer could maintain a cause of action against the
tortfeasor in the name of the sister, and recoup from the tortfeasor the
payments he made to the sister. Any recovery in excess of the work-
men's compensation award would be paid to the dependent of the
deceased.4 '
This doctrine was followed in Taylor v. State ex rel. Mearsj8 in
which dependent illegitimate children of a deceased father, who also
had living legitimate children (primary claimants), were found to be
entitled to recover against the negligent party for the wrongful death of
their father. The court, however, was careful to limit its holding:
We do not mean to qualify in any way the holding in State
ex rel. Holt v. Try, Inc., . . . [i] f these illegitimate children in
this appeal had not been entitled to sue as dependents under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, but had proceeded solely under
the wrongful death statute, they would have had no standing to
sue ... Whatever doubts may exist concerning such a legal in-
congruity we feel bound by our prior decisions, ... any change
that may be deemed advisable must come, we feel, from legisla-
tive enactment and not by judicial construction.4
Therefore, if the father of dependent illegitimate children is killed by
a tortfeasor in the scope of his employment, a claim for workmen's
compensation benefits against the employer and an action for wrongful
death may be maintained on behalf of his illegitimate children, even
when a primary claimant is a party in the same action. But, if the father
46. At that time the wrongful death statute did not provide for the second class of claimants
under which, today, the sister could have maintained the wrongful death action. Act of
May 25, 1852, c. 299, § 2, [1852] Laws of Maryland.
47. Mech v. Storrs, 169 Md. 150, 157, 179 A. 525, 529 (1935); Clough & Molloy, Inc. v.
Shilling, 149 Md. 189, 131 A. 343 (1925).
48. 233 Md. 406, 197 A.2d 116 (1964).
49. Id. at 413, 197 A.2d at 119-20. See Flores v. King, 13 Md. App. 270, 282 A.2d 521 (1971),
which emphasizes that for the workmen's compensation statute to expand the class of
wrongful death claimants, the deceased had to be killed in the scope of covered
employment by a tortfeasor.
1974]
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was not in covered employment or was not killed within the scope of
his employment, and had a wife, parent or legitimate child living at the
time of his wrongful death, his dependent illegitimate children would
be denied recovery.
To summarize, there are three instances in which Maryland law may
possibly be construed so as to entitle an illegitimate child a cause of
action for the wrongful death of his father. But these are exceptional
cases under a statute which generally discriminates against illegitimate
children in relation to their father. The Holt courts' interpretation of
the word "child" as not including an illegitimate child means that
illegitimates may not recover wrongful death benefits as a primary
claimant. The statute allows an illegitimate child to recover as a claim-
ant only if no primary beneficiary qualifies and thus clearly does not
treat legitimate and illegitimate children equally.
THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A series of recent Supreme Court decisions has cast doubt on the
constitutionality of statutes which discriminate on the basis of legiti-
macy. In Levy v. Louisiana,"° the United States Supreme Court held
that a Louisiana statute which denied illegitimate children the right to
maintain an action for the wrongful death of their mother, but granted
that right to legitimate children, was unconstitutional. In a companion
case, Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co.,' 5 the
same statute was also found to be invalid because it, conversely, stated
that the mother of a legitimate child could maintain an action for the
wrongful death of her child, but that the mother of an illegitimate child
had no such right.
The rationale of these decisions is not clear. In determining whether
a particular state or federal statutory classification contravenes the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, courts have
generally applied one of two distinguishable tests: the rational basis test
or the compelling state interest test. The traditional standard is the
rational basis test, which requires the one who is attacking a statutory
classification as unconstitutional to carry the burden of showing that it
does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.' 2
The compelling state interest test is a stricter standard which applies in
the exceptional cases where either a "suspect classification" or a "fun-
damental right" is involved. A statute which denies rights to a particular
50. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
51. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Although Glona involved a mother seeking to recover for the wrongful
death of her illegitimate child, the Court's rationale should apply to the Maryland statute
which does not authorize recovery by a father for the wrongful death of his illegitimate
child. See note 70 infra.
52. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425
(1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463
(1957).
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class solely on the basis of a condition over which members of the class
have no control is inherently suspect.' ' A fundamental right is one
which is either expressly or impliedly protected by the Constitution. '
Thus, suspect classifications would encompass discrimination on the
basis of race,5 " ancestry, 6 and alienage, ' while fundamental rights
would include statutes which affect the right to vote 8 and pro-
create. 9
If the compelling state interest test is the proper standard to be used,
the statute is presumed to be unconstitutional and, therefore, the
burden of justifying the classification shifts from the challenging party
to the state.6 0 For a state interest to be shown to be compelling, the
government must establish that the classification is necessary to protect
against "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests....,,,6
Rarely can the state meet such a heavy burden, and, in fact, it has been
said that a compelling state interest exists only in theory.6 2 Thus, the
decision as to which test should be applied is usually decisive of the
equal protection claim.6 3
The Levy decision does not clearly indicate which equal protection
test the Court applied.6  Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, first
stated: "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is
whether the line drawn is a rational one." '6  But he later said:
"[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil
rights.... ,,66 The former language is indicative of the rational basis
53. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973).
The inherently suspect classification argument has in the past been made using the due
process clause rather than the equal protection clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First
Decision on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 338, 347 (1968-69).
54. Schwartz, Municipal Services Litigation After Rodriguez, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 93, 95
(1973). See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to travel); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (religious freedom); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960) (freedom of association).
55. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
56. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
58. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
59. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
60. In re Griffiths. 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1957).
61. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945).
62. "For the law to require that the town must show a compelling interest to justify the
priorities it establishes in making capital improvements simply requires the impossible."
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1180 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), with Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
64. This lack of clarity has resulted in considerable confusion. Levy has been cited as an
example of an application of the rational basis test. United States v. Weatherwood, 471
F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1972). On the other hand, it has also been cited as an application of
the compelling state interest test. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973);
United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1338 (6th Cir. 1973); Beatty v. Weinberger, 478
F.2d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1973).
65. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
66. Id.
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test, while the latter is relevant to a compelling state interest. Because
the Court's rationale was not clear, it is necesIsary to discuss which
equal protection test should be applied.
The right to recover wrongful death benefits probably is not a
fundamental right. In cases decided after Levy the Supreme Court has
held that there is no explicit or implicit constitutional right to an
education,6 7 housing,6 8  or welfare benefits. 6 9 These rights are similar
to the right to recover wrongful death benefits in that all are wholly
statutory in nature. Since they are not constitutionally guaranteed,
strict scrutiny is not required. Nevertheless, application of the compel-
ling state interest test would appear appropriate because illegitimacy is
an inherently suspect classification-denial of wrongful death benefits
solely because the claimant is illegitimate is discriminating against him
on the basis of a factor over which he has no control. However, this
reasoning, although applicable in Levy where the claimants were illegiti-
mate children, would not apply in Glona where the mother was the
claimant. The mother could have avoided the "sin" which resulted in
the child's birth or presumably brought a paternity action to legitimate
the child. She could control her status and thus no suspect classification
was involved. The Glona result, therefore, appears justifiable only as an
application of the rational basis test, and, indeed, the Court's opinion is
clearer in that regard.7 0
The foregoing indicates that there is an argument that the compelling
state interest test applies to state statutes, such as Maryland's wrongful
death statute, which discriminate against illegitimate children. Never-
theless, the following discussion will assume that the appropriate test is
the rational basis one. For if the statute cannot even survive that test,
there is no need to consider whether it serves a compelling state
interest.7
Since the Levy decision, several state courts have considered the
question of whether it is unconstitutional for a state to discriminate
against illegitimates in relation to their father. Most of these courts7 2
67. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
69. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
70. In Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), the state argued that
since the mother had control over her actions and had committed a "sin", the state should
be allowed to punish her by denying her certain rights which non-sinners enjoy. Yet the
court felt that there was no possible rational basis in the state's contention that denying
mother's of illegitimate children the right to recover for their children's wrongful death,
would reduce the rate of illegitimacy.
It would indeed be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so
that they can be compensated in damages for their death. A law which creates an
open season on illegitimates in the area of automobile accidents gives a windfall to
tortfeasors. But it hardly has a causal connection with the "sin," which is, we are
told the historic reason for the creation of the disability.
Id. at 75. See KRAUSE supra note 2, at 67.
71. Schwartz, Municipal Services Litigation After Rodriguez, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 93, 95-96
(1973).
72. Cannon v. Transamerican Freight Lines, 37 Mich. App. 313, 194 N.W.2d 736 (1971);
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have held that, on the basis of the Levy decision, it is unconstitutional
to discriminate against illegitimate children with regard to either parent.
Only Mississippi" 3 and Florida 74 have held otherwise, and it appears
that their decisions are clearly erroneous.
In the leading state case which found Levy applicable to the father-
child relationship, a cause of action was maintained on behalf of five
dependent illegitimate children for the wrongful death of their natural
father.7 The effect of the state wrongful death statute involved was
that the illegitimate children could recover for the wrongful death of
their mother, but could only recover for the wrongful death of their
father if the parents should marry and treat him as their child. The
court, holding the statute incompatible with the equal protection clause
as applied in Levy, concluded that Levy could not be confined to those
cases which deal with the relation of an illegitimate child and his
mother. "[I]t can be of no logical moment whether the parent was the
mother or the father."
7 6
A different result was reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court.7'
The Mississippi wrongful death statute did not permit an illegitimate
child to recover damages for the wrongful death of his father, but
allowed that cause of action for the wrongful death of his mother. The
Weaks v. Mounter, -Nev.-, 493 P.2d 1307 (1972); Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J.
194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969); In re Estate of Perez, 69 Misc. 2d 538, 330 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sur. Ct.
1972); In re Estate of Ross, 67 Misc. 2d 320, 323 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sur. Ct. 1971); In re Estate
of Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sur. Ct. 1969). Cf. R. 000 v. R. 000, 431
S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
The Louisiana Supreme Court apparently has interpreted Levy as applying to the
illegitimate child-father relationship. In its opinion on remand from the Supreme Court,
the Louisiana court stated: "The United States Supreme Court has held that... when a
parent openly and publicly recognizes and accepts an illegitimate to be his or her child
and the child is dependent upon the parent, such an illegitimate is a child as expressed in
[the Louisiana wrongful death statute]." Levy v. State ex rel. Charity Hosp., 253 La.73, 75,
216 So. 2d 818, 820 (1968) (emphasis added).
An interesting case is Jenkins v. Collette, 335 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. La. 1971). A wrongful
death action was brought under the Louisiana statute considered in Levy on behalf of
legitimate children by their mother, a Mississippi citizen. The defendant- were Louisiana
citizens so diversity apparently was established. But the deceased had a second family
with two illegitimate children in Louisiana. On the defendants' motion the court
dismissed the Mississippi mother's action for failure to join the illegitimate children as
indispensable parties. The effect of joinder would have been to destroy diversity
jurisdiction. In order to find that the illegitimate children were indispensable parties, the
court must have believed that they could recover under the statute for their father's
wrongful death.
The Virginia Court of Appeals, relying on its own earlier decisions, has held that the
word "children" in Virginia's wrongful death statute includes an illegitimate child
seeking to recover for the death of his father. Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 604, 179 S.E.2d
620 (1971).
73. Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971).
74. City of West Palm Beach v. Cowart, 241 So. 2d 748 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1970); cf. Baston
v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968) (support), apparently overruled by
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
75. Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969).
76. Id. at 201, 254 A.2d at 529.
77. Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971).
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court upheld the statute as constitutional and distinguished Levy as
applying only to the mother of illegitimate children. The court felt that
its statutory distinction was based upon a logical classification of
claimants.
It is a simple matter to prove the maternity of an illegitimate
child, but it is infinitely more complex to prove the paternity.
It is only necessary for the father to be present at the laying of
the keel, not at the launching of the ship. The mother must be
present at both, and it is not at all difficult to prove who
launched the ship.7"
The Mississippi court's rationale is fallacious. The relevant question is
not whether maternity is easier to prove than paternity. Because the
action was brought by an illegitimate child seeking to recover for the
wrongful death of his father, proof of maternity was irrelevant. The
material question is whether proving paternity of an illegitimate child is
so far more difficult than proving paternity of a legitimate child that it
provides a rational basis for the discrimination. Whether the proof
problem provides a rational basis will be discussed later.7 "
The state cases interpreting the impact of Levy on the illegiiimate
child-father relationship in the area of wrongful death were decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.8" In that case dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate
children sought to recover benefits under Louisiana's workmen's com-
pensation laws for the death of their natural father on an equal basis
with his dependent legitimate children. The challenged statute per-
mitted unacknowledged illegitimate children the right to recover death
benefits only to the extent that decedent's legitimate children had not
exhausted the maximum payable compensation.8  The court used Levy
as precedent for their decision holding the statute unconstitutional.
78. Id. at 200.
79. See p. 265 infra.
80. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
81. The deceased father in Weber had four legitimate and two illegitimate children all of
whom were dependent upon him for their support. After his death, workmen's
compensation claims were filed on behalf of all six children. Prior to any payment under
workmen's compensation, the four legitimate children recovered against the third party
tortfeasor who was responsible for their father's death, an amount in excess of the
maximum benefits allowable under Louisiana's workmen's compensation statute. The
trial judge in the subsequent compensation case declared that, because any amount
recovered from the tortfeasor is set off from the workmen's compensation payment, the
award had been satisfied from the tort settlement and the illegitimate children therefore
got nothing.
The illegitimate children challenged the decision on the gound that the Louisiana
workmen's compensation statute denied them equal protection of the law. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, affirming, distinguished Levy as applying only to a statute which
excluded all illegitimates from any possible recovery. Under this compensation statute,
"the unacknowledged illegitimate child is not denied a right to recover compensation, he
is merely relegated to a less favorable position as are other dependent relatives such as
parents. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 433-34, 242 So. 2d 567, 570
(1970).
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Even though the statute did not absolutely bar illegitimates from
benefits, the court found it to be an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection of the law since it denied them rights available to other
dependent children.8 2
Weber indicates that discrimination in the illegitimate child-father
relationship in the area of workmen's compensation is unconstitutional.
Both workmen's compensation and wrongful death statutes are state
created compensation schemes designed to provide for dependents of
the deceased after his accidental death.8 3 Because of this similarity it
does not appear likely that the Supreme Court would hold the discrimi-
nation constitutional if wrongful death were at issue when it has
already held invalid a similar workmen's compensation statute.8 4
ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY THE DISCRIMINATION
Levy established that discrimination between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children in the recovery of wrongful death benefits in relation to
their mother was unconstitutional. Weber extended that principle to
the illegitimate child-father relationship in a workmen's compensation
case. Although these cases have been discussed, the arguments set forth
to justify the discrimination have not. State officials seeking to preserve
state statutes have asserted four state interests. None of these interests
would seem to provide a rational basis for the discrimination advanced
by Maryland's wrongful death statute.
Historically illegitimates were viewed as "sin turned into flesh," and
thus one asserted justification for discrimination against illegitimates
has been that a state may pass legislation which discourages illicit sexual
82. The Weber court had to distinguish Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), in which the
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a Louisiana statute which discriminated against
illegitimate children in the area of intestate succession. Three distinguishing characteris-
tics were set forth. First, Labine involved state regulation of the disposition of property at
death, an area in which the states have traditionally been given broad discretion. Second,
the substantial state interest in stability of land titles and prompt determination of
ownership of property left by decedents was not involved in a workmen's compensation
action. Finally, in Labine the intestate could have insured that his illegitimate child
would have taken equally by executing a will or marrying the child's mother. The
deceased could not have given his illegitimate child such protection in Weber because the
Louisiana statute prohibited acknowledgment of children whose parents were incapable
of contracting marriage. The father in Weber remained married to his first wife, not the
illegitimate children's mother, until his death. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 173 (1972).
83. In extending the Levy rationale the Weber Court relied on the similarity between
workmen's compensation and wrongful death statutes. 406 U.S. at 171.
84. The Weber Court did not decide whether the rational basis test or the compelling state
interest test was the proper standard. After discussing cases applying both tests, the
Court stated: "The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a
dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" 406 U.S. at 173. The
Court considered several asserted state interests and rejected each as not being promoted
by the statute. The Court concluded: "[Tihe classification is justified by no legitimate
state interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. at 176.
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intercourse.8 This argument assumes that an unmarried couple con-
templating sexual intercourse will be so concerned about the discrimi-
nation which awaits an illegitimate child, that they will refrain from the
sexual activity. It is doubtful that the couple would be versed in this
area of the law and therefore they probably would not know whether
state law discriminated against illegitimates; and even if they did, it is
highly unlikely that their conduct would be deterred. Further, it is not
logical to punish the child to deter the conduct of his parents.8 6
Certainly the parent's conduct would be more effectively altered if
they, rather than their progen y, were risking serious legal conse-
quences which could result from their illicit activity. Therefore, al-
though a state may have a valid interest in preventing sin, it is readily
apparent that the denial of rights to illegitimate children has no connec-
tion with the goal of discouraging illicit relations.' 7
States have also argued that discrimination against illegitimate chil-
dren serves the important state interest of preserving the family unit.
The rationale for this argument is that the parents will be encouraged to
marry if greater rights are given to legitimate offspring than those born
of extramarital unions.8 To repeat, it is doubtful that those who are
about to enter into an illicit relationship contemplate the discrimina-
tion which awaits illegitimate offspring. Further, marriage after birth of
the child would not be encouraged by this state discrimination, because
marriage alone does not legitimate the child.8 9 Finally, it is unjust and
illogical to punish the child for the faults of the parents. As was the
case for the state interest in preventing sin, there is no causal connec-
tion between denial of rights to illegitimate children and preservation of
the family unit.
States may validly confine recovery of wrongful death benefits solely
to those who are dependent on the deceased.9" A child who is not
being supported by the deceased simply does not need the protection
the statute is intended to provide. Using this premise, one state has
attempted to defend a statute which discriminated against illegitimate
children on the basis that such children normally do not have a close
living relationship with their parents.9 I This amounts to saying that an
illegitimate child is not likely to be dependent on one or both of his
parents. Since the statute in that case required proof of dependency
before authorizing recovery, the court found the argument to be
without merit.9 2 Maryland's statute requires proof of dependency
85. KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 2.
86. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 557 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
87. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
88. Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
89. See p. 255 supra. But marriage of the parents before the child's birth would legitimate the
child at common law. Id. Assuming that the definition of illegitimate child in Maryland's
inheritance statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-208 (1969), applies to the wrongful death
statute, marriage of the parents after the child's birth would legitimate the child if the
father acknolwedged the child to be his.
90. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(8) (Supp. 1973).
91. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
92. See Note, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1969).
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before an illegitimate child may recover, but does not so require for a
legitimate child. Even if an illegitimate child can conclusively establish
that he was wholly dependent on his deceased parent, the statute still
denies recovery if a legitimate child or other primary claimant were a
party. Since the statute provides unequal treatment even though the
illegitimate child may in fact be wholly dependent, it is apparent that
dependency is not the basis for Maryland's discrimination. Therefore,
the dependency argument cannot provide a rational basis.
The three state interests discussed thus far have been asserted to
justify discrimination against illegitimate children in relation to both
parents. The fourth argument attempts to justify discrimination against
the illegitimate primarily in relation to his father. The argument is that
illegitimate birth furnishes less convincing evidence of paternity than
does birth in wedlock.9" By denying all illegitimate children the right
to recover for the death of their father, the state minimizes the danger
of fraudulent claims of paternity. Once again, the assumption on which
this argument rests is of doubtful validity. Illegitimate children stand in
the same blood relationship with their fathers as legitimate children.
Modern scientific techniques have made proof of paternity far more
reliable than in the past.9 4 In addition, the child may have other
non-scientific evidence of paternity, such as his mother's testimony.
Moreover, it is the function of the trier of fact to determine the validity
of paternity claims.9 ' It is clearly irrational to deny recovery to an
illegitimate child who is ready and able to prove paternity simply
because some claimants may try to do so and fail.9 6
In order for a court to find that a rational basis exists for the
93. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (dissenting opinion);
Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971).
94. KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 127-36.
Whereas exclusions can be established with scientific, absolute certainty,
inclusions can be established by degrees of probability. At the extreme end of the
spectrum, paternity can be all but determined positively, because some genes are
so rare that, if the same genes are found in the putative father and the child, "the
possibility of coincidence being responsible is so remote as to make the odds
astronomical."
Id. at 127, citing L. SUSSMAN, BLOOD GROUPING TESTS-MEDICOLEGAL USES 83 (1968).
Note that MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66G (1973), denies children the right to introduce
blood tests as evidence in "Paternity Proceedings" unless the test results would establish
that the defendant was not the father. See Buford v. Bunn, 247 Md. 203, 230 A.2d 636
(1967). Although no case has arisen, the statute may be construed to be applicable to an
illegitimate child attempting to establish paternity so that he may recover wrongful death
benefits. If so, proof of paternity would be more difficult to establish.
95. Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 640, 643, 179 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1971): "But a person who claims
to be decedent's child has the burden of proving that the decedent was his parent. We
should not assume that finders on fact will not intelligently and justly resolve issues of
paternity based on the evidence before them and guided by the law."
96. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Nor may the discrimination be justified through
the assertion that by denying illegitimate children the right to recover benefits the state
avoids the burden of hearing paternity claims. "[Elven though the State's interest in
achieving administrative efficiency 'is not without some legitimacy,' '[t]o give a
mandatory preference.., merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
[ConstitutionI .... Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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discrimination against illegitimates, it must find a constitutionally per-
missive objective and a causal connection between that objective and
the means chosen to achieve it.9 ' In applying this test the Supreme
Court has in the past upheld a discriminatory classification if the means
chosen serves any conceivable legitimate state purpose.9 8 In more
recent cases, however, the Court has not been willing to consider
hypothetical purposes, but has looked to what it considers to be the
real purpose of the discriminatory classification.9 9 Assuming the objec-
tives asserted in the preceding arguments are the real objectives to be
furthered by the discriminatory classification, and assuming further
that the objectives are valid state interests, those objectives simply are
not promoted by denial of equal rights to illegitimates.
Even if the statute is found to satisfy the rational basis test, it may
be argued that the more stringent compelling state interest is the
appropriate standard.' " Maryland's wrongful death statute certainly
cannot satisfy this test, which requires the state to show not only that
its objective is constitutionally permitted, but also that it has chosen
the "least restrictive alternative" which would accomplish that objec-
tive.' 0 1 For each of the four interests asserted there are better methods
of achieving the state's objective than denying rights to illegitimate
children. The only logical conclusion is that Maryland's wrongful death
statute as construed in Holt is unconstitutional as applied to an illegiti-
mate child's right to recover for the wrongful death of his father.
INVALIDITY OR EXPANSION OF STATUTE
Assuming that the Maryland wrongful death statute, as construed, is
found unconstitutional, a question arises whether the court should
enlarge the reach of the statute, thus allowing recovery of benefits on
behalf of illegitimate children for their father's wrongful death, or
whether the portion of the statute referring to children should be
striken so that no child, legitimate or illegitimate, may recover.
97. See Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065. 1078 (1969).
98. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). "Legislatures are presumed to have acted
constitutionally ... and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds
can be conceived to justify them. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955).
99. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (citation omitted):
Conceding that the State could, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause,
regard the problems of extramarital and premarital sexual relations as "[elvils...
of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies," we
cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably be regarded as
the purpose of the . .. law.
"But in Baird the Court did not adhere to these highly tolerant standards of traditional
judicial review...." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
104 (1973) (Marshall. J., dissenting).
100. See p. 260 supra.
101. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). See also Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
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As a general proposition, courts construing statutes must attempt to
ascertain, and then to effectuate, the legislative intent.' 02 Thus when
the statute is unambiguous and the intention of the legislature is clear,
the court must give effect to it as written, unless the effect is constitu-
tionally prohibited.' However, when the statute is susceptable of
two different constructions, one of which would render the statute
unconstitutional, the court should give effect to the construction which
will preserve the statute rather than invalidate it.' 0 4 The court may
only do this if in fact the statute is susceptable to two different
constructions. A court has no power to construe statutes to mean more
than the legislature obviously intended and thereby legislate by judicial
fiat.' o 5
The Maryland court may avoid holding the statute unconstitutional
by simply changing their own prior interpretation of the word "chil-
dren" so that it will now include illegitimate children, assuming the
statute is susceptable to such a construction. For example, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Levy, the Louisiana court had construed
the word "children" in that state's wrongful death statute to include
only legitimate children. On remand after the Supreme Court had held
the statute unconstitutional, it was argued that the entire article creat-
ing wrongful death rights in children had to be declared invalid because
"judicial review may not legislate by amendment but must accept a
legislative act as enacted or declare it unconstitutional."' 06 However,
the court held that its definition of the word "children" would be
changed to include illegitimate children, and to do so would not be
judicial legislation.' 0 7
The Maryland Court of Appeals has construed the word "child" in
the Maryland wrongful death statute so as not to include an illegitimate
child whose father is wrongfully killed. The court could change its
definition of "child" as did the Louisiana court. In doing so it would
not be legislating judicially, but merely changing its interpretation of
what the legislature meant by the word "child" as used in the statute.
As the prior discussion indicated, there is an apparent ambiguity in the
construction of the word "child" in the wrongful death statute when
read in conjunction with article 1, section 16. Applying the rule that a
statute susceptable to two different interpretations should be given the
construction which renders it most effectual, the court could construe
the word "child" to include an illegitimate child, thus avoiding consti-
tutional invalidity.
102. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 241 A.2d 714 (1968);
Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 217 A.2d 355 (1966).
103. Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964); Rogan v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 188 Md. 44, 52 A.2d 261 (1947).
104. Rogan v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 188 Md. 44, 52 A.2d 261 (1947); Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184
Md. 371, 46 A.2d 618 (1946).
105. Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 221 A.2d 632 (1966).




The Holt court, however, believed the legislature clearly intended
that illegitimate children be excluded. In the face of such a strong
precedent, the court may feel that the statute is not susceptable to any
other construction of the word "child." The court may then be unwill-
ing to save the statute through a change in construction.
Even if the court reaffirms the prior interpretation of the statute, it
need not deny recovery for illegitimate children. Another court' 0 8 was
faced with a statute which could not be saved by a change in interpreta-
tion. The problem was handled in this way:
Defendant contends the judiciary cannot enlarge the reach of
a statute, for that is solely a legislative function. The proposi-
tion is obvious enough, and it is equally true that a court may
not restrict the scope of a statute. But neither proposition is
involved when the question is whether a statute must fall
because of a constitutional defect. Rather the question is
whether the Legislature would want the statute to survive, and
that inquiry cannot turn simply upon whether the statute, if
adjusted to the constitutional demand, will cover more or less
than its terms purport to cover. Although cases may be found
which seem to speak in such mechanical terms, we think the
sounder course is to consider what is involved and to decide
from the sense of the situation whether the Legislature would
want the statute to succumb.
And so here the question is whether the Legislature was so
intent upon denying protection to illegitimate children that it
would prefer the wrongful death statute to be totally void. We
think the question answers itself....
We therefore conclude that the constitutional difficulty is
properly resolved by holding that, for the purpose of the
wrongful death statute, illegitimate children shall be deemed to
be children of their natural parents." 0 9
In Maryland there is some basis for concluding that the legislature,
had it imagined that the treatment of illegitimates in the wrongful
death statute would be found to be unconstitutional, would have
included illegitimates within the class of primary claimants rather than
to preclude all children from recovery. This is evidenced by the equal
treatment that the legislature has afforded illegitimates in the area of
workmen's compensation' ' and support.' ' ' Therefore, it appears
that the legislature would have wanted the Maryland judiciary to take
the equitable course of including the illegitimates within the statute,
rather than nullifying the statute altogether.
108. Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969).
109. Id. at 202-03, 254 A.2d at 529-31.
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(8) (Supp. 1973); Huber v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 241 F. Supp.
646 (D. Md. 1965).
111. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66A (1973).
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CONCLUSION
Illegitimacy is a serious social problem, but the illegitimate child is
not the cause. The recent Supreme Court decisions recognize that
legislation which attempts to remedy this social evil by discriminating
against illegitimates is misdirected. However, even though nearly six
years have passed since the Levy decision, no action has been taken to
correct the discriminatory effect of the Maryland statute, despite its
unconstitutionality when applied to an illegitimate child's right to
recover for the wrongful death of his father.' ' 2 If the legislature fails
to bring Maryland's wrongful death statute within constitutional
bounds, the Maryland courts will be forced to declare the statute
invalid.' 3
Richard S. Haynes
112. One Maryland trial court has recently refused to hold the statute unconstitutional.
The Court... supports Plaintiffs' thinking that the Maryland Court of Appeals
should re-examine Holt vs. Try, Inc. in light of evolving law and current reasoning
in other jurisdictions. However, at this time and in this jurisdiction, the law seems
to be clear and governed by [Holt] .... "
Williams v. Worsham, 1972 Doc. No. 132829 (Baltimore Super. Ct., Oct. 9, 1973) (citation
omitted), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds sub nom. Fowlkes v. Morrell, No. 820
(Ct. Spec. App., Jan. 23, 1974).
113. H.B. 1067, Md. Gen. Assem., 1974 Sess., apparently has been introduced to correct the
constitutional defect in the wrongful death statute. The bill states that its proposed
purpose is "providing that an illegitimate child has a right to bring an action under the
wrongful death statute for the death of his father as well as his mother .... The bill
would change the definition of child in § 3-901(b) to include an illegitimate child. This
change would accomplish the desired result. However the bill proposes to add an
additional subsection, § 3-904(G), which provides:
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, A PERSON BORN TO PARENTS
WHO HAVE NOT PARTICIPATED IN A MARRIAGE CEREMONY WITH
EACH OTHER IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE CHILD OF HIS MOTHER. HE
IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE CHILD OF HIS FATHER ONLY IF HIS
FATHER (1) HAS BEEN JUDICIALLY DETERMINED TO BE THE FATHER
IN A PROCEEDING BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 66E OF ARTICLE 16, OR
(2) HAS ACKNOWLEDGED HIMSELF IN WRITING, TO BE THE FATHER,
OR (3) HAS OPENLY AND NOTORIOUSLY RECOGNIZED THE PERSON TO
BE HIS CHILD, OR (4) HAS SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED THE MOTHER
AND HAS ACKNOLWEDGED HIMSELF, ORALLY OR IN WRITING, TO BE
THE FATHER.
Note that the proposed language is almost identical to that of MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §
1-208 (1969). Although the amendment would allow some illegitimate children to be
legitimated for purposes of the wrongful death statute, see p. 255 supra, many
illegitimate children would continue to be excluded from recovery. Thus, if the bill were
passed as is, Maryland's wrongful death statute would apparently still be unconstitu-
tional.
